The One Question – by Jason Hines
When most of us think religion and the Supreme Court, we think of one phrase – separation of church and state. Those of a more conservative bent who do not agree with the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on religion would be quick to point out that the phrase cannot be found in the Constitution. However, the question of the importance of the separation mantra is not the most important and foundational question in this realm of the law (though over the course of this week we will examine that question as well). The most important question the Court addresses is the also the one question that the Court does not really answer.
In 1965, the Supreme Court heard the cases of two men who were convicted for refusal to be inducted into the armed forces. The men, Seeger, and Jakobson, believed that they should be relieved from duty based on the Universal Military Training and Service Act (UMTSA), which allowed for conscientious objectors based on religious beliefs. The UMTSA defined religion as “an individual’s belief in relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.”[1] Seeger and Jakobson claimed the religious belief exemption but refused to affirm a belief in a Supreme Being. The Court found in their favor, intentionally attempting to broaden their understanding of what a religion was in the modern age. Instead of focusing on the belief in a Supreme Being, the Court decided that the test of this particular statute would be satisfied by “A sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by … God…”[2]
In 1970 the Court returned to the question of what constitutes a religious belief in the case of U.S. v. Welsh. Once again a petitioner, Elliot Welsh refused to report for military duty. Unlike Seeger and Jakobson, Welsh made no attempt to couch his beliefs in any kind of spiritual or metaphysical framework. The government felt it had an open and shut case – if even the petitioner would not describe his beliefs as religious, then there was no way that he could claim a religious exemption from military service. The Court disagreed. It decided to go even further than it did in the Seeger decision, ruling that the objection only had to “stem from the registrant’s moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions.”[3] Therefore, how Welsh described his beliefs was not relevant so long as it could be found that his beliefs held the strength of traditional religious convictions.
These are the only two cases where the Court attempts to define what a religion or what a religious belief, is. Unfortunately the Court does not give us any hard and fast guidance, at least not of the sort that most religious communities would know and understand. Instead the Court gives us this amorphous sense of what religion might be, and when you really look at it, the definition of religion barely means anything at all. By the time the Court rules of the Welsh case, “religion” has seemingly devolved into “any belief that is really important to you.” The Court does not seem to care where the belief comes from either.
I can see how the Court’s all or none approach to religious belief might bother some Christians. If I am honest with myself, sometimes it does bother me. I think Christians inherently feel special and unique. We are the ones who have found the narrow road. We are the ones who will be rewarded by God for our faith. Hell awaits the teeming masses of humanity who, through their own selfishness, were unwilling to take hold of God’s free gift of grace. At least that is what we tell ourselves. So it touches a cord deep within us when the Court turns around and says that our beliefs are no more special than The Church of Beer or Fonzism, or worst yet – atheists. However, I think the Court is to be commended. By protecting the fringes, the Court ensures that the religious beliefs of all are protecting. And I am not sure that I would want the nine wise souls in Washington determining whether my faith is actually a faith at all. When it comes to religion, the Court already has its hands full protecting the two principles enshrined in the Religion Clauses – but we’ll talk about that another time.
Jason Hines is an attorney with a PhD in Religion, Politics, and Society from the J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies at Baylor University. He blogs about religious liberty and other issues at http://thehinesight.blogspot.com.
[1] 380 U.S. 163, at 165.
[2] 380 U.S. at 176, 180.
[3] 398 U.S. at 334.